

MORI/CDF

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H/W REENCIPHERMENT OF SAIGON 0221 RUMJIR 0603

MORI C05148250

T O P S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 221515Z OCT 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER SAIGON 0221 FLASH
TO: GENERAL HAIG, THE WHITE HOUSE
HAKTO 42

1. I HAVE THOUGHT THE SITUATION OVER AND THERE IS NO VIABLE ROUTE EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION OPTION WHICH MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER TO GET AHEAD OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WHICH HAS TO BE DELIVERED IN PARIS AT 11:00 P.M. TODAY, SUNDAY, PARIS TIME.

2. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE DRV PRIME MINISTER IMMEDIATELY TO GUAY FOR HIM TO DELIVER TO HIS CUSTOMER AT HIS 11:00 P.M. MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHICH SATISFIES ALL HIS POINTS WITH RESPECT TO LAOS AND CAMBODIA AS WELL AS U.S. PRISONERS.

AS THE DRV SIDE KNOWS, THE U.S. SIDE HAS MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS IN SAIGON, VIENTIANE, PHNOM PENH AND BANGKOK TO SECURE AN AGREEMENT. AS THE DRV SIDE ALSO KNOWS, THE U.S. SIDE HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IT COULD NOT PROCEED UNILATERALLY. UNFORTUNATELY THE DIFFICULTIES IN SAIGON HAVE PROVED SOMEWHAT MORE COMPLEX THAN ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. SOME OF THEM CONCERN MATTERS WHICH THE U.S. SIDE IS HONOR-BOUND TO PUT BEFORE THE DRV SIDE.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

THE PRESIDENT WISHES THE PRIME MINISTER TO KNOW THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAS ASKED DR. KISSINGER TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO CONSULT ON WHAT FURTHER STEPS TO TAKE.

THE PRESIDENT MUST POINT OUT THAT THE BREACH OF CONFIDENCE COMMITTED BY THE DRV SIDE WITH RESPECT TO THE ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW BEARS CONSIDERABLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN SAIGON.

THE PRESIDENT REQUESTS THAT THE DRV SIDE TAKE NO PUBLIC ACTION UNTIL HE CAN SUBMIT A LONGER MESSAGE WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

THE U.S. SIDE REAFFIRMS ITS COMMITMENT TO THE SUBSTANCE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. END TEXT.

3. BEFORE THE ABOVE MESSAGE IS DELIVERED IN PARIS YOU MUST TALK TO DOBRYNIN ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH FOUR OF HAKTO 41. IT IS OUR ONLY VIABLE COURSE. BECAUSE OF THE TIME PRESSURES YOU SHOULD PRESENT OUR APPROACH VERBALLY AND SAY THAT A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE FOLLOWING. AFTER SEEING DOBRYNIN YOU SHOULD TURN THE APPROACH INTO A LETTER FOR PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE. ONE POINT YOU MUST KEEP IN MIND IN TALKING TO DOBRYNIN IS THAT WHEN WE SAY WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A BILATERAL AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE A STRICTLY BILATERAL DEAL BUT RATHER A DOCUMENT THAT THE DRV AND WE WOULD SIGN WITH A RECOMMENDATION TO THE OTHER PARTIES THAT THEY ACCEPT IT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IN TALKING TO DOBRYNIN YOU DO NOT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DEAL WOULD BE STRICTLY BILATERAL; RATHER IT WOULD BE ONE IN WHICH WE RECOMMENDED OTHER PARTIES TO JOIN. ALSO IN TALKING TO DOBRYNIN YOU CAN TELL HIM THAT JUST AS I INFORMED HIM BEFORE I LEFT, THE ISSUE OF THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH HAS TURNED OUT TO BE THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE AND IT IS ONE IN WHICH WE ARE IN A VERY WEAK POSITION.

WARM REGARDS

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